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Introduction
Foreign firms that trade their equity on US stock exchanges face serious obstacles in attracting US investors and analysts due to the linguistic, procedural, and institutional differences between their home country and the United States (Lundholm et al., 2014) . This paper examines the favorable effects of top executives' US background in attracting US institutional investors and analysts using data from US-listed Chinese firms. We predict that US-listed Chinese firms whose top executives have experience in working in the US attract more US institutional investors and analysts. First, we conjecture that executives with a US background perform better in communicating with US institutional investors and analysts. Due to their US experience, firms can attract more US institutional investors by hiring top executives with a US background. There are three potential reasons, as follows.
First, top executives of foreign firms, especially CFOs, who have work experience in the US may perform better in communicating with US investors and analysts. Due to their US experience, they generally have an advantage in understanding US business culture and how to interact with US business people. More importantly, they are more familiar with what US investors expect and more likely to act in alignment with US norms. Therefore, we argue that CFOs with US experience are better at communicating with US investors and analysts.
Second, we argue that hiring top executives with a US background can potentially serve as a kind of reputational insurance mechanism. Top executives who have worked or are currently working in the US should better understand the stringent regulations and pay more attention to their reputations in the US market than those who work in the Chinese market. Therefore, firms that hire top executives with a US background may build an image of well-bonded corporations, and thus US institutional investors will prefer to invest in those firms. Consistent with our reputational bonding argument, Beatty et al. (2013) find that the likelihood of financial fraud in US-listed Chinese firms is significantly lower if the CEO was educated in North America.
Third, top executives' US background may reduce the ''psychological distance" between Americans and foreign firms. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) use the unique setting of Finland where there are two cultural origins and find that investors prefer to hold and trade with firms whose CEO is of a similar cultural origin. Consequently, top executives with a US background may increase US investors' familiarity with foreign firms and reduce their psychological distance, and hence these firms are expected to attract more institutional investors. Based on the above analyses, we predict that US institutional investors and analysts exhibit a preference for US-listed Chinese firms with top executives with US work experience.
We use US-listed Chinese firms 1 as our research sample. China is geographically and culturally distant from the US. China's legal system originated from Roman Civil Law and differs from US Common Law. Allen et al. (2005) compare overall investor protection in mainland China with the countries included in La Porta et al. (1998) . They find that mainland China is rated one of the worst and the US one of the best financial markets in terms of investor protection. Therefore, there is a significant gap between China and the US, and Chinese firms may face considerable difficulty in attracting US investors and analysts. We use US-listed Chinese firms as our research sample to examine whether hiring executives with US experience could help firms to attract US investors and analysts.
Based on the above analysis, we state our hypotheses as follows:
H1: US-listed Chinese firms with top executives who have worked in the US attract more institutional ownership. H2: US-listed Chinese firms with top executives who have worked in the US attract higher analyst following.
Sample selection and descriptive statistics
Our sample period is 2006-2012. We compile a sample of US-listed Chinese firms from various sources: (1) Wind database, (2) Bank of New York, which provides a list of ADRs on its website, (3) Sina Finance website, and (4) Compustat. We exclude firms that are headquartered outside mainland China by reviewing the corporate profiles. We also exclude financial firms. As a result, our final sample comprises 213 US-listed Chinese firms.
Generally, the CFO, Investor Relations Officer or Vice President of Investor Relations takes charge of investor relations development and mostly communicates with analysts and institutional investors. We hand collect the profiles of all of the top executives from firms' annual reports and proxy statements and find that few of the firms in our sample specifically disclose information on the Investor Relations Officer or Vice President of Investor Relations. Therefore, we mainly focus on two top executives: (1) the CFO, who is in charge of information disclosure and communicating with analysts and institutional investors; and (2) the CEO, who takes overall charge of corporate management. We manually extract information on the CEOs' and CFOs' work experience and educational background from SEC filings, such as annual reports and proxy statements.
Financial data are extracted from Compustat. Analyst data are obtained from Institutional Broker's Estimate System (IBES). Institutional investor data are taken from TR 13f. We hand collect all of the required information from 10-Ks, 20-Fs, and proxy statements filed by Chinese firms during the sample period, including insider ownership (holdings by the firms' officers and directors), foreigner blockholders (nonChinese owners with 5% ownership or higher), board characteristics (board size, board independence), and whether the CEO is the founder of the firm. We also hand collect the conference call and management forecast data from current reports (i.e., 8 k, 6 k). The variable definitions are summarized in Appendix A. We construct two variables, CEOworkUS and CFOworkUS, to explicitly capture CEOs' and CFOs' work experience in the US, respectively. Correspondingly, we construct another two variables, CEOWorkOverseas We use the abovementioned variables as primary indicators in our main tests. As a robustness check, we construct another series of variables to capture CEOs' and CFOs' US or overseas experience based on their educational background rather than their career path. First, we construct the variables CEOeduUS and CFOeduUS to capture whether the CEO and the CFO were educated in the US. Then, we construct another two variables, CEOeduOverseas and CFOeduOverseas, to capture whether the CEOs and CFOs were educated abroad but excluding the US. The percentages of CEOs who were educated in the US and other foreign countries or regions are 18% and 9%, respectively. Correspondingly, the percentages for CFOs are 47% and 24%, respectively. This means that 73% of CEOs and less than one-third of CFOs had their education in mainland China. The CFOs are clearly more internationalized than the CEOs in our sample.
We also manually collect data on CFOs' undergraduate universities or institutions. In summary, 15.53% of CFOs graduated from universities or colleges that are not included in the ''211 program" in China; 30.28% of CFOs graduated from universities that are members of the ''211 program" but not the ''985 program"; 18.66% of CFOs graduated from the top tier universities that are members of the ''985 program"; and 35.53% of CFOs graduated from universities or institutions overseas.
We also summarize the highest educational qualifications of CEOs and CFOs. A significantly higher percentage of CFOs (40%) than CEOs (15.76%) received an MBA degree, whereas 13% of CEOs received a Ph.D. compared with 2.09% of CFOs.
We also construct two variables to measure whether the CEO or CFO joined the firm before the IPO, CEOpreIPO and CFOpreIPO, respectively. We find that 82% of the CEOs in our sample joined their firms before the IPO; 69% of CEOs were the founder or co-founder of their firms; and 54% of CFOs joined before the IPO.
In Table 3 , we describe the main dependent variables in our research. We collect institutional ownership positions from Thomson Financial's 13-F filings database. We measure institutional holdings using the most recent data prior to the end month of fiscal year.
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The mean of #InstOwners is 40.82. Approximately 26% of observations have less than 10 institutional investors, including 78 firms listed through reverse mergers; 48.5% of observations have between 11 and 50 institutional investors; 15% of observations have between 50 and 100 institutional investors; 9.4% of observations have between 100 and 200 institutional investors; and 1.2% of observations have more than 200 institutional investors.
The mean institutional ownership is 15.46%; approximately 36% of observations have less than 5% institutional ownership, of which 15% of observations were listed through reverse mergers; approximately half of the observations have between 5% and 30% institutional ownership; and the remaining 15% of observations have more than 30% institutional ownership.
We also provide a detailed distribution of the analyst coverage variable. We collect analysts' data from the IBES database. We measure analyst following using the most recent data prior to the last month of the fiscal year and set missing analyst data to zero. The data for analyst coverage are left-censored at 0. Approximately 18% of observations have up to two analysts following the firm; 32% of observations have between 3 and 10 analysts; and approximately 17% of observations have more than 10 analysts. The maximum number of analysts following a firm in our sample is 54. This is generally consistent with our previous argument that it is difficult to attract analysts for foreign firms issuing securities on US exchanges. Table 4 summarizes the results of the univariate analysis. The mean analyst coverage is 7.83 for the group in which WorkUS equals 1 and 3.85 for the group in which WorkUS equals 0. The t-test results show that the 
Research design and main results
We examine the effect of top executives' US experience on analyst following and institutional investors using the following models:
We control for top executives' other overseas experience to ensure the results are cleanly measuring the effect of US experience. As the literature documents that corporate governance can affect analyst coverage and institutional investor following, we use three proxies for corporate governance and control for them in the regressions. We first control for listing method (RM) to capture the quality of corporate governance. Chen et al. (2013) suggest that for Chinese firms that have low bonding incentives and poor governance, the reverse merger process provides an opportunity to access the US capital markets. We also control for common corporate governance features: board characteristics and ownership structure. Our second proxy for corporate governance is board independence. Corporate boards of directors monitor top executives and make decisions about top managers' compensation and retention. Board independence has been widely used as a proxy of the board's aggressive ability to curb opportunistic managerial behavior in the presence of agency problems (e.g., Klein, 2002; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007) . Our third proxy for corporate governance is the existence of foreign institutional blockholders. We use an indicator of whether the firm has one or more foreign block institutional investors (non-Chinese institutional owners with 5% ownership or higher) to capture the quality of corporate governance, following previous studies that suggest that institutional investors play an important monitoring role in reducing agency costs.
We also include the following control variables: (1) InsiderOwn, which captures the holdings by the officers and directors; (2) BoardSize, which measures the size of the board; (3) Founder, which captures whether the CEO is the founder of the firm; (4) and Size, which equals the log of total assets, and several financial indicators including the book-to-market ratio, return on assets, and leverage.
The main results are shown in Table 5 . We report robust t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. Column 1 shows that the coefficient of WorkUS is positive and significant at the 0.05 significance level, which means that top executives' work experience in the US has a significant positive effect on analyst following. The coefficient of WorkOverseas is insignificant, which suggests that executives' work experience in other countries or regions does not benefit the firms by attracting analysts in the US market. Consistent with our expectation, the coefficients of Blockholder, Independence, Founder, Size, and ROA are positive and significant. Columns 2 and 3 show that the coefficients of WorkUS are positive and significant at the 0.01 significance level, which means that top executives' work experience in the US has a positive effect on both the number of institutional investors and their level of ownership.
Next, to examine whether executives' US work experience dominates the results, we construct two new variables to separately capture CEOs' and CFOs' work experience in the US. Correspondingly, we construct two variables to explicitly capture CEOs' and CFOs' work experience in other countries or regions outside the Chinese mainland, but excluding the US. We predict that CFOs' US experience is relatively influential in our research, because CFOs normally take charge of information disclosure and communication with analysts and institutional owners. Table 6 shows that, consistent with our prediction, CFOs' US experience dominates the results.
Robustness checks and additional tests

Controlling for discretionary accruals
We further control for discretionary accruals to capture earnings quality in the robustness analysis and the results remain unchanged.
3 We use the modified Jones model to calculate discretionary accruals. We do not control for discretionary accrual based earnings quality in the main test to avoid further sample reduction. 
Innate ability explanation
So far, we have shown that CFOs with US experience have a positive effect on analyst following and institutional holdings. It could be argued that these benefits may be due to CFOs' exceptional ability, rather than their US experience. To rule out this alternative explanation, we provide some evidence suggesting that US experience may matter, beyond the executives' ability. Most of the CFOs in our sample obtained their undergraduate degrees in China. Following Giannetti et al. (2014) , we measure CFO ability using the rankings of their Chinese universities. We sort the universities into top tier, second tier, and third tier. As the results in Table 7 show, the coefficient of CFOworkUS is significantly positive after controlling for university ranking, which suggests that CFOs' US experience matters beyond their innate ability. Note: This table reports the OLS regression results for the effect of CFOs' US experience on institutional investors (columns 2 and 3) and the Tobit regression results for the effect of CFOs' US experience on analyst following (column 1). All of the variables are defined in Appendix A. Coefficient estimates are provided in the top row and p-values in the bottom row. * , ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels (two-tailed test), respectively.
Self-selection problem
The choice of hiring a CFO with US experience may be determined by corporate governance, the existence of foreign large blockholders, and the CEO's characteristics. We use the Heckman two-stage method to control for this potential self-selection issue. In the first stage, we design a model to examine the possibility of a firm hiring a CFO with US experience. We use CFOpreIPO as an instrumental variable. Column 4 of Table 8 shows the results of the first stage. The results are consistent with the previous main results after controlling for lambda in the second-stage regressions (Columns 1-3 of Table 8 ). 
Global investment banking experience
We test whether executives' global investment banking experience has an additional effect on the number of analysts and institutional investors following the firm. We find that CFOs' global investment bank experience has an additional positive effect on analyst coverage. 
Alternative measure of US background
We also use another measure to capture executives' US background. We extract the executives' educational background from their biographies and construct the CEOeduUS and CFOeduUS variables to indicate whether they were educated in the US. The results are similar to the main results. 
Other top executives' US background
Generally, the board secretary is in charge of investor relations in Chinese listed firms. It is possible that US-listed Chinese firms follow this custom and the board secretary functions as an IR specialist to communicate with investors and analysts. Therefore, we also test whether the board secretary's US experience has an effect on the number of analysts and institutional investors following the firm. However, the results show no support for this effect, which implies that CFOs play a critical role in communicating with analysts and investors in US-listed Chinese firms.
Are CFOs with US experience more likely to hold conference calls?
There is evidence to suggest that CFOs have a significant influence on companies' financial reporting (e.g., Geiger and North, 2006; Ge et al., 2010) . We argue that CFOs with US experience may act more in alignment with US norms in disclosure practices, such as holding conference calls, and thus may attract more US institutional investors and analysts (e.g., Kimbrough, 2005) . Consistent with our expectation, we find that (1) firms with US experienced CFOs are more likely to hold conference calls, and (2) the frequency of conference calls is significantly higher for firms with US-experienced CFOs. Columns 1 and 3 of Table 9 report the results, which provide direct evidence of how CFOs with US experience are able to help US-listed Chinese firms to attract more US investors and analysts.
Do CFOs with US experience voluntarily disclose more management forecasts?
Given that releasing management earnings forecasts is normal practice in the US, CFOs with US experience may act more similarly to domestic US managers in terms of their disclosure activities, such as voluntarily disclosing earnings forecasts, and thus attract more US institutional investors and analysts. Consistent with our argument, we find that (1) firms with US-experienced CFOs are more likely to voluntarily issue management forecasts, and (2) the frequency of management forecasts is significantly higher for firms with US-experienced CFOs. Columns 2 and 4 of Table 9 report the results, which provide direct evidence of how CFOs with US experience are able to help US-listed Chinese firms to attract more US investors and analysts.
Conclusion
We use US-listed Chinese firms as our research sample and find that firms that hire top executives (i.e., CEOs or CFOs) with work experience in the US or educational qualifications from the US attract more analysts and institutional investors. Further, we find that CFOs' US experience dominates the results. To eliminate the innate ability argument, we control for CFO innate ability by following Giannetti et al. (2014) and the results remain consistent. We use the two-stage Heckman method to eliminate selection bias and the results again remain consistent. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that we cannot totally resolve the firm-executive matching endogeneity problem.
As supporting evidence, we find that firms with US-experienced executives tend to hold more conference calls and voluntarily issue more management forecasts. This complements previous studies documenting the effect of information disclosure on analysts' and institutional investors' activities by looking beyond the outcomes and identifying the core management drivers. Our results suggest that foreign firms attempt to lower investors' and analysts' information disadvantage or psychological distance by hiring top executives with US experience.
Our findings provide a deeper understanding of the mechanisms that facilitate US-listed Chinese firms to obtain international capital or resources and the results may be generalizable to other foreign firms cross-listed on US exchanges.
